Finally we provide evidence that the regime shifts generally imply higher relative risk for real estate securities after the estimated breaks.
The recent upheaval in the Far East has made economists reevaluate the relations among financial markets on the international stage and also within each country. The crisis, commonly dubbed the Asian flu began on July 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai baht. It quickly spread through all nations in the Far East, although with widely differing intensity and duration. A commonly reported driver of this crisis was the banking sector's overextension of credit to real estate. Allegedly, as real estate markets plummeted, banks suffered enormous losses due to their exposure to real estate developers; these problems then spread to the rest of the financial sector.
1 For example, for Thailand, Frank Flatters (2000, p. 261) offers the following analysis:
Among the factors contributing to the vulnerability of the system were the following: large and growing short-term liabilities relative to foreign reserves, which themselves were rapidly diminishing as the Bank of Thailand tried to maintain the baht's peg; the increasing oversupply of real estate, especially in 1 Renaud (2000) provides an overview of the role of real estate in the Asian crisis focusing on Thailand; see also his earlier analysis of global real estate cycles (Renaud 1997) .
Bangkok, which hurt the property and construction sectors directly, and also threatened the value of the principal form of collateral used in much bank lending.
A related, pithy observation comes from Paul Krugman (1999, p. ix) :
How did a few bad real estate loans and a botched devaluation in Thailand a small, faraway country of which most people knew little-send dominoes toppling from Indonesia to South Korea?
We will show that one effect of the crisis was to reduce real estate returns and to increase real estate volatility and correlation with other asset classes. But this general effect played out differently across the individual countries. The real estate indexes of China. Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand peaked in 1995, well before the start of the crisis. This suggests that the events of 1997 and 1998 should have affected the.se countries differently than those who.se real estate markets continued to be strong into 1997.
While a wide variety of explanations for the crisis have emerged, including poor corporate governance, lack of proper banking supervision, IMF bungling, hedge fund herding, and so forth, much of the problem seemed to center in real estate markets. It is thus interesting to analyze how real estate and equity markets reacted during the time around the crisis. While a number of other studies have focused on the returns themselves, typically searching for increases in correlations, 2 our approach is different. We proceed in two stages. The first question we address is Granger causality: During this time period did real estate lead equity (stocks) or vice versa? We examine this question both for the return and volatility of real estate and equity in each country. The existence of Granger causality then motivates the second, and perhaps more interesting question: Did the crisis fundamentally change the relation between real estate and equity markets, or was it merely a manifestation of the natural dependencies in these markets? To answer this problem we test, separately within each of these developing eight countries, for statistically significant changes in the structural relation between equity and real estate markets. In this context, we use the term "structural relation" to refer not only to the lead/lag pattern and the strength of correlation across the equity and real estate asset markets, but also to the relation between the volatilities in those two markets within each country.
We define a shock or regime shift as the most statistically significant change in the posited structural relation during the span of time from well before to well after the crisis event. Thus, we are looking for the time around the crisis when the dynamics of the relation between the return and volatility of real estate and equity shifted the most. If we find no shock in a given country, 3 then we are tempted to conclude that much of the crisis was a manifestation of natural dependencies in these markets. This view is outlined in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . On the other hand, if we see a regime shift, it suggests that the fundamental relation between real estate and equity markets has changed. More specifically, using the recently developed statistical technique of Bai, Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) , hereafter referred to as BLS, 4 we identify regime shifts in the time series of monthly real estate and equity index returns and volatilities in each country. We use monthly data to mitigate the effects of estimation in a very noisy series. 5 Our objective is not only to identify as precisely as possible the date of a regime break, but also to study the nature of any observed regime break.
The final segment of our analysis focuses on potential explanations for the observed pattern in regime breaks across countries, such as trade, leverage, corporate governance, or legal structures.
Financial crises have generated a wide variety of economic explanations and models. 6 One important rationale underlying the market contagion effect is that trade linkages provide a channel tor the spread of financial problems. From Obstfeld (1999, p. 7):
Thus, crises may contain a self-fulfilling element, just as bank runs do, which can generate multiple equilibria in international asset markets, and render the timing of crises somewhat indeterminate. What we see in these cases is a sharp break from an essentially tranquil equilibrium to a crisis state, rather than a gradual deterioration in domestic interest rates and other market-based indicators.
This effect is modeled in Allen and Gale (2000) . They find that the possibility of contagion is highly dependent upon the completeness of the market for interregional claims. Related to these models is the idea that the spread of financial crises is exaggerated because of incomplete information; see, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) . Thus, a crisis in one country signals information about the financial condition of other countries that share underlying regional factors and trade patterns. This can lead to herding and the rampant withdrawal of foreign funds. This creates pressure on the domestic currencies and interest rates. In the Asian crisis, this capital flight, in particular the withdrawal of hedge fund capital, is often assumed to have played an important role. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2000) show that while the funds" positions were volatile, these movements were not highly correlated with fluctuations in FX rates, thus casting doubts on the importance of the role that hedge funds played in 3 By "no shock" we mean that the identified regime break is not statistically significant. This is clarified in the following section. 4 Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (1998) Thus it is of interest to evaluate the type of information effects that characterize the Asian crisis.
In particular, it all markets experience structural breaks simultaneously, then common information shocks appear to predominate. This then suggests that return expectations were affected in all markets concurrently. Conversely, information contagion or spillover effects are significant if the timing of regime shifts differs across markets. Observing the sequence of regime breaks can help us understand the drivers of this significant event. It is important to emphasize that we do not assume that a regime break occurred in a given country during the reported crisis period. The technique we employ identifies the single most significant break in the posited relation over the sample period. However, this break could be statistically insignificant.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section describes the statistical methodology. The third section describes our data set. The fourth section presents our empirical results, and the final section contains our conclusions. An appendix provides an analysis of the returns on real estate securities versus returns on the underlying real estate in these developing markets.
Methodology
The problem of detecting breaks in economic time series has received increasing attention by the econometric literature. Although several time series models 7 have been proposed to provide estimates of break dates, formal measures of the precision of these estimates were unavailable. The estimation of a confidence interval around the break date is important to economists, as it incorporates a measure of sampling uncertainty into the analysis. The statistical method adopted here, devised by Bai, Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) , provides inference about breaks, including interval estimation of the break date.
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The BLS technique searches for a single break in a multivariate time series and specifies asymptotic confidence intervals for the break point. We use this methodology to test for regime shifts in the (linear) relation between equity and real estate markets in each country separately. The technique is particularly appealing because it does not require that residuals are normally distributed. Here we illustrate the approach for equity and real estate return time series.
Month t real estate index return in local currency is the dependent variable in our model.
Independent variables are the corresponding local equity returns in each of the five months t -2 to t + 2 (to account for possible lead-lag relations) and the real estate return in month t -I (to account for firstorder autocorrelation). A parallel analysis is done on monthly volatility, where we use the 12-month rolling volatility estimate. 9 For returns, we adopt the following specification:
Here k is a potential break date, y t is the real estate index return in month t for a given country, and x t is the corresponding equity return in month t. The dummy d t (k) introduces a shift in the coefficients of Equation (1) at time k. This equation is also motivated by Dimson's (1979) approach to estimating betas with infrequent trading. We can interpret the b i s at different tags as betas and, ignoring serial autocorrelation, the aggregate of the b i s would be an estimate of the beta of the real estate index. 10 With this interpretation of Equation (1), the BLS technique selects the most significant shift in betas over the sample period. Analyzing the corresponding β i s will allow us to analyze the nature of any structural break in the relation between equity and real estate returns.
The above equation in stacked form becomes 8 A more detailed description of our methodology is available from the authors upon request. 9 The adoption of a rolling 12-month standard deviation appears first in Officer (1973) and Merton (1980) . Our results are not sensitive to the particular averaging length. 10 In our case, the equity index is also relatively illiquid, so that Dimson's approach is warranted. When the equity index is liquid, calculating the beta of a real estate index requires just the use of lagged values of the equity index; see Geltner (1989 Geltner ( , 1991 for an analysis of this topic.
In matrix form this is:
The model permits a wide variety of assumptions about parameter shifts. For example, the model is one of a full structural change if all coefficients are allowed to change. If it is assumed that only a subset of the coefficients undergoes a regime shift, then a partial structural model is appropriate. For example, if we suspect a break only in the intercept, then S = [1,0,0,0,0,0,0].
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A variety of tests for a break, based on Wald statistics, have been proposed in the literature. The null hypothesis is that Sδ = 0 for k = k* +1,…,T -k*, where k* is some trimming value. 12 The test adopted in this paper, analogous to Quandt (1960) , considers the maximum of the following F process:
where
, based on OLS residuals under the alternative hypothesis given k. The estimator for B is The estimated break date is then � A, the argmax of � {k).
To summarize, we first identify a likely candidate for a break date in the posited relation as the date corresponding to the maximum of this Wald statistic over the sample period. This break is statistically significant if and only if that Wald statistic is above a chosen threshold, which is determined by the given significance level.
We also search for breaks in the volatility series. The rolled volatility is calculated as a moving standard deviation of 12 monthly returns for the real estate (σ y ) and equity (σ x ) index returns. 13 The 11 As reported in Bai. Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) tests for partial structural changes tend to have better power than those for full structural changes. In that case, (he unchanged parameters .should be estimated using all the available observations to gain efficiency. However, our analysis indicates that the breaks are statistically significant even when we use a full structural model rather than simply allowing a subset of the parameters to break. 12 The trimming value used in this specification is k* =5. 13 For this case, the trimming value we adopted was k* =4.
proposed model is the following:
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The econometric specifications adopted in this paper represent a balance among the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, economic rationale, and data availability constraints. As a check on the robustness of our results, different lead-lag specifications of the structural relation were also tested. The Wald statistics were also computed for time intervals different from the ones chosen for our analysis. The results, which are available on request from the authors, show that the Wald statistics and the estimated regime shifts are robust to these modifications. 
Data and Preliminary Statistics
We analyze equity and real estate indexes for our eight Asian markets: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. For each of the markets, we use the major equity index in local currency to calculate a monthly time series of "local" returns. The corresponding real estate indexes are subsets of the equity indexes. The monthly equity and property indexes for each country are obtained from Bloomberg. Table 1 describes the indexes used. The varying composition of the real estate indexes has to be taken into consideration when interpreting our results.
For example, only five real-estate-related stocks comprise the real estate index for China. Furthermore, as Table 2 indicates, the dates for which data are available differ slightly across each of the countries, again making cross-country comparisons a little more awkward. Finally, our study focuses on real estate returns derived from real-estate-related equities rather than more direct measures of real estate 14 Note that, by construction, the rolled volatility series has positive serial correlation. We take this into account by including a lagged term in the regression model. However, since we are not interested in a break in the serial correlation pattern, we do not allow the serial correlation coefficient to vary.
performance due to data restrictions. In the appendix, we examine the relation between the performance of securitized real estate and the underlying real markets. The appendix shows, for most countries, that the real estate security index returns exhibit a fairly strong tendency to move with the underlying real estate returns and that real estate securities in each country have similar average returns, albeit higher variances, than the underlying real estate.
The means and standard deviations of monthly returns shown in Table 2 
Empirical Results

Granger Causality
We begin with an examination of the lead/lag relations between real estate and equity markets.
Granger causality tests measure the predictive ability of the chosen time-series models. For example, the time series of real estate returns "Granger causes" the time series of equity returns if, after controlling for the past history of equity returns, real estate returns can offer a statistically significant explanation of the residual (unexplained variability) in the equity return series. Our null hypothesis is that x {equity returns or volatility) does not Granger cause z (real estate returns or volatility); that is, the β i are not significantly different from zero. The entries in Table 3 represent the F-statistics arising from the joint test that all β i =0. The test statistic is 15 We use up to four lags to allow for relatively long-term effects without sacrificing too many observations.
where SS 1 is the sum of squares from Equation (7); SS 0 is the sum of squares of Equation (7) under the null hypothesis restriction that all β l are zero; d is the lag length; n is the number of observations. We test causality separately for returns and volatility.
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16 By construction, the volatility series is highly persistent, which makes it more likely that the F-statistic in Equation (8) is insignificant. Hence, any evidence of Granger causality in the case of volatility can be interpreted with more confidence that in the case of returns.
Panel A of Table 3 shows very little indication that real estate returns Granger cause equity returns, casting doubt on the assertion that real estate might have caused the Asian crisis. Only one entry is significant at the 0.05 level; Korea at 4 lags. Panel B, on the other hand, provides evidence that equity returns Granger cause real estate returns. In Korea the relation is .significant at the 0.05 level at lags 2 to 4; for Malaysia, the relation is significant at the 0.05 level at lags 3 and 4. For the Philippines, the relation is significant at the 0.05 level at lags 1 to 3. For Thailand, the relation is significant at 2 lags.
Overall, in half of these countries (the exceptions being China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Taiwan) equity returns appear to Granger cause real estate returns and there is only scant evidence that the converse is true.
When we turn to volatility, a different picture emerges. In three countries (China, South Korea, and the Philippines), the fact that real estate volatility seems to cause equity volatility and vice versa suggests very strongly that there is a common factor affecting the real estate/equity volatility relation in these countries. This implies that our simple Granger relation is misspecified, since we are missing a common explanatory variable for both series. This supports the existence of a common information shock for volatility across equity and real estate markets. Only in Hong Kong and Thailand do we find no statistical evidence of causality in either direction. For Indonesia and Malaysia, we see that equity volatility Granger causes real estate volatility, while the converse is the case in Taiwan. This analysis seems to suggest that the volatility relations are stronger and more complex than the return relations.
Also, we can see that it is difficult to make broad generalizations about the countries in our sample. This point will be echoed in the following analysis of regime breaks.
Regime Break Analysis
We now focus on whether there were breaks either in the historical intertemporal crosscorrelation relation or in the volatility relation between real estate and equity. The former is the subject of Figure 2 and Tables 4 and 6 , while the latter is the subject of Figure 3 and Tables 5 and 6 . We proceed by estimating Equations (I) and (6) respectively for each possible break date in the sample history ranging from well before the crisis to substantially after the crisis, and by computing the Wald statistic as described in Equation (4).
With respect to the structural relation in returns between real estate and equity, Figure 2 and Table 4 reveal that no significant regime shift occurs for Indonesia. 17 The remaining seven countries all experience a statistically significant break. 18 The earliest regime shift occurred in China and the Philippines, in late 1996. These regime shifts are prior to the period generally associated with the inception of the Asian crisis (July 1997). The next structural break between real estate and equity returns occurs in the first half of 1998 in Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand. The confidence intervals for these countries overlap, and. as such, the breaks in these countries are assumed concurrent. All other countries-Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan-appear to experience concurrent breaks in the latter half of 1998. This evidence suggests that structural breaks between real estate and equity market returns in each country seem to occur after the crisis period in the summer of 1997.
17 Stated more precisely, the identified regime break was not statistically significant. In this case because it occurred very near the end of our observed time period. 18 In an earlier draft of this paper, we included Australia and Japan in our analysis. Australia exhibited no regime breaks. Japan had no significant return break, but had a volatility break in October 1988, roughly corresponding to the end of the real estate bubble. These countries are excluded from this analysis to allow us to focus on developing countries.
The existence and timing of the volatility breaks in the structural relation between real estate and equity markets differs somewhat from the break dates in returns. Figure 3 shows Taiwan and
Malaysia experience concurrent regime shifts in the volatility relation around mid-1995 to early 1996: this period predates the period for returns. For the remaining countries, the sequence for breaks in volatility starts with Indonesia, which breaks around June 1997. Contemporaneous volatility breaks follow for Hong Kong and the Philippines in the first half of 1998. Finally, Korea and Thailand experience a structural break in volatility in summer 1998. The evidence on volatility breaks indicates that structural breaks in volatility between equity and real estate markets are associated with common information shocks, although there is some evidence of information spillover effects in 1997 and 1998. The difference in the return and volatility findings is partly attributable to the different regression fits of the return data relative to the volatility data. In essence, since the adjusted R-s arc higher for the volatility regressions, the constructed confidence intervals are tighter, making it easier to determine statistically significant differences in the timing of regime breaks.
An analysis of the pre-and postbreak regressions, given in Table 4 for returns and Table 5 for volatility, sheds further light on the nature of these regime shifts. The postbreak coefficients should be interpreted as incremental changes to the prebreak coefficients. However, since the breaks tend to occur near the end of our data set, and because of possible multicollinearity, the individual coefficient changes have generally weak statistical significance. This is less of a problem with the volatility model, since it is more parsimonious. Table 4 shows that the regime shift increased the sensitivity of real estate returns to changes in equity returns. 19 This can be most easily seen by interpreting the coefficients as betas.
We focus on the values in the X and ΔX columns: these can be interpreted as the real estate betas prior to and after the estimated regime break. Note that all of the prebreak betas (the values in the X column) are significantly positive except for Malaysia and Thailand. The average beta is 0.68, which is a plausible beta for a real estate index. The changes in the beta after the break (given in the ΔX column) are positive except for China; the average increase in beta is 0.15. These results suggest that after the regime breaks in returns, the systematic risk of the real estate indexes increased. Thus, there is a stronger linkage between equity and real estate returns after the structural break. As such, diversification benefits from real estate decrease after the break. Table 5 reveals that the regime shifts also changed the nature of the relation between equity volatility and real estate volatility. The volatility relation is stronger than the return relation between equity and real estate as evidenced by the generally higher adjusted R 2 s. As in Table 4 , we will confine our interpretation to the X and ΔX columns. The X column represents the degree to which volatility in the equity indexes is spread to the real estate indexes in each country. If we exclude Indonesia (which has a very curious coefficient of -3.075), all of the coefficients are positive and significant, as expected,
with an average value of 0.557. The average of the ΔX column (again excluding Indonesia) is 0.266. This analysis indicates that, like the return analysis, there is an increase in the relative risk of real estate securities, on average.
Analyzing the Regime Breaks
In aggregate, our analysis of regime breaks for returns and volatilities allows us to recognize the existence of two groups in our sample of eight countries. The first group is China, the Philippines, and
Taiwan. The second group is Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, South Korea, perhaps due to its more developed, industrial nature, seems not to fit into either group. Analysis of cross-country correlations for equity and real estate return and return volatility (noted earlier in this paper) corroborate this classification. In this section we attempt to uncover some rationale for this apparent grouping. Columns 3 and 4 show the average leverage for the real estate companies that compose the real estate index in each of our countries. Although the overall leverage is similar in both groups, real estate companies in Group 0 had slightly lower levels of short-and long-term debt; for example, they have a ratio of short-term debt to total capital of 13.8% versus 16.9% for Group 1.
The budget deficits were significantly greater in Group 0 than in Group 1. This suggests that Group 0 countries were more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, which may help explain why their volatility regime breaks occur much before Group 1's.
The external debt to GDP, short-term debt to total reserves, and debt to export ratios are much higher for Group 1 countries, indicating that country indebtedness and trade play a role in the clustering of regime breaks. The trade linkages within Group 0 are also strong; for example, among the other seven countries in our sample, the largest market for Taiwan's imports is China (11.3% of all exports).
The country's legal and governance structure as measured by the components of the opacity index (which uses survey data to measure the quality of a country's financial and legal framework), family control, cash flow, voting rights and measures of judicial efficiency do not seem to play a very important role.
Conclusions
Anyone who claims to fully understand the economic disaster that has overtaken Asia proves, by that very certainty, that he doesn't know what he is talking about….The truth is that we have never seen anything quite like this.
-Paul Krugman, speech for CSFB, Hong Kong, March 1998
Since much of the chaos associated with the Asian crisis centered on real estate markets, our study investigates the structural relation between the real estate market and the equity markets in eight developing Asian countries. Our approach involved two basic steps. First, our Granger causality analysis suggests equity returns cause real estate returns and not the converse. Thus, we find little support for the hypothesis that real estate caused the crisis. The Granger causality analysis of volatility shows significant two-way causality, suggesting instead that a common factor, not specified in our reduced form model, tends to induce higher dispersion of beliefs among market participants in both equity and real estate emerging markets. Secondly, we apply the statistical technique of Bai, Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) to analyze the nature of the regime shifts and to test which type of information event is associated with the identified shift. We find that structural breaks in both returns and volatility were commonplace in these countries during the period 1997 to 1998. Most of these regime shifts appear to occur concurrently, which is evidence that common information effects were dominant in these markets. We also find evidence that the regime shifts in returns and volatilities generally imply higher risk for real estate securities after the estimated breaks, both in the form of total risk or volatility and in the form of systemic risk or beta with respect to the stock market. While the clustering of regime breaks does not seem to follow any obvious pattern, the country's exposure to trade and firm leverage are important. The legal and corporate governance structure of a country do not seem to be much help in explaining the observed regime breaks.
From our exploratory analysis we can see various manifestations of increased risk and decreased diversification opportunities after the crisis. Although a simple explanation that covers all countries does not emerge from our analysis we can see that the crisis caused major structural shifts in real estate and equity markets, generally implying higher relative risk for real estate securities. Our results also show that, in general, the crisis was not a manifestation of the natural dependencies in these countries, but that the crisis evolved in rather different ways in the countries we study. In essence, PMI repackages market research from nine real estate organizations, including
Brooke International, Cushman Wakefield, and Colliers Jardine. The companies provide PMI with net operating income and transaction prices; PMI then computes real estate indexes from these data.
Although the PMI data are reported both on an annual and quarterly basis, only the last two years are reported on a quarterly basis. 22 Moreover, the data are classified according to the providers of information. We use indexes based on data that Brooke International (formerly Brooke Hillier Parker)
provide to PMI, since they represent the longest time series of office real estate return data for each country. Since the number of semiannual index (return) periods ranges from 6 (5) for Indonesia to 13 (12) for Malaysia, our analysis is cursory at best. As such, the usual caveats apply. Table 8 reports the means and variances of semiannual returns for real estate securities and underlying real estate in our eight Asian countries. The tests for means show no significant differences between direct and securitized real estate investment, although this is largely due to the paucity of observations. There is no apparent pattern in the differences; in four cases, direct investment has a higher mean and in four cases it has a lower mean. There is more consistency in the analysis of differences in standard deviations. As with U.S. real estate data, the standard deviation is higher for real estate securities than direct real estate. In our data, this difference is significant for all but Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Korea. Of greater interest is the comovement of real estate securities with the underlying real estate in each country. Figure 4 graphs the total return index for real estate securities and direct real estate investment for each of the eight countries in our sample, along with the correlation coefficient. Note that the correlations are negative for China (-0.18 ) and the Philippines (-0.45), which is curious. This negative correlation can help explain some anomalies in our earlier empirical analysis of these two countries. 22 The PMI indexes that we use in this paper are based on data from Brooke International. These indexes are often termed "notional" indexes because they are, in large part, based on brokers' opinions of values and cap rates. PMI indexes based on data from other real estate organizations, such as Cushman and Wakefield, are driven by actual transaction prices. These indexes, however, are only available for a few of the countries in our sample and for a shorter time period than the PMI indexes. Table 9 investigates the relation between the securitized and underlying assets further. Shifting now to returns rather than levels of the indexes, we analyze the lead and lag relations in each of the eight countries. Since the data are semiannual and relatively sparse, it is not surprising that few of the correlations are significant. The average correlations are positive; the largest is 0.507 at a lead of one (although only slightly larger than the correlation of 0.416 at one lag).
This suggests that the relation between real and securitized markets is quite strong but that the lead/lag relations are more ambiguous.
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In summary, we rationalize focusing on real estate securities given the restrictions on foreign ownership of direct real estate in most Asian countries that we study. In addition, the lack of established property law is a concern to institutional investors. Also, for most countries, the real estate security index returns exhibit a fairly strong tendency to move with the underlying real estate returns. Weak evidence also exists that real estate securities in each country have similar average returns, albeit higher variances, than the underlying real estate.
23 Empirical studies on the relation between real estate securities and direct real estate returns have somewhat differing conclusions. A number of articles suggest that a positive, lagged relation exists between securitized and unsecuritized real estate, with securitized returns leading unsecuritized returns or cap rates; see, for example, Gyourko and Keim (1992) , Fisher, Geltner and Webb (1994) , Barkham and Geltner (1995) , and Geltner and Goetzmann (2000) . Conversely, Liu and Mei (1992) find that returns on real estate investment trusts (REITs) can be predicted by capitalization rates based on actual transaction prices.
